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CRIMINAL LAW
IMPEACHMENT WITH UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE: COMING
TO GRIPS WITH THE PERJUROUS DEFENDANT*
JEFFREY COLEt
Of all the decisions of the Warren Court in the
field of criminal law,1 none has provoked more
vocal controversy than Miranda v. Arizona.2 In
Miranda,the Court delineated the now well known
system of warnings which must be administered
to a suspect subjected to "custodial interrogation." ' This system of warnings was required to
dispel the compulsion which the Court found inherent in the atmosphere surrounding such interrogations.'
* See editor's note at p. 16 infra.
f B.S. J.D. (1968), Deputy Chief, Appellate Division, Office of the United States Attorney, Northern
District of Illinois. The views expressed herein are the
authors own and do not necessarily reflect those of the

of Justice.
Department
1
See A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL
T OF RE oam 71 passim
DE cISION AS AN INSTRt
(1968).
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Recently, Mr. Justice Clark
observed that Miranda "has been publicized more
widely than any opinion of the Court since Brown v.
Board of Education ...." United States v. Jackson,

To insure adherence to its commands, Miranda
announced a rule excluding from evidence any
statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory,
obtained in the absence of warnings.5 This exclusionary rule fashioned by the Court was to apply
in situations where the government attempted to
introduce illegally obtained evidence in its casein-chief. It is not clear, however, whether that rule
applies when the prosecution seeks to introduce
such evidence to impeach a defendant who has
taken the witness stand and, in his own direct
examination, perjured himself.
Resolution of that question must take into account the Supreme Court's earlier decision in
Walder v. United States.' In Walder, a prior narcotics indictment had been dismissed after the
defendant had secured suppression of a heroin
capsule obtained through an unlawful search and
seizure. During his trial on a second narcotics offense committed two years later, the defendant
voluntarily took the stand and, during his own
direct examination, made a "sweeping denial"
that he had ever had narcotics in his possession.

429 F.2d 1368, 1372 (7th Cir. 1970) (Clark, J., by
designation).
3The Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
384 U.S. at 444. "This is what [the Court] meant in warning, the appellate courts have consistently held
Escobedo v. Illinois, 1378 U.S. 478 (1964)]- when [it] that a literal reading of Miranda is improper, for, the
spoke of an investigation which had focused on an ac- words of Mirandado not constitute a ritualistic formula
cused." Id. at 444 n.4. Of course, where an interview or which must be repeated without variation to be effecinterrogation is non-custodial, compliance with the tive. Words which convey the substance of the warning
along with the required information are sufficient. See
strictures of Miranda is not required. See id. at 477478; United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2nd Cir. 1969); Sweeney v. United States, 408 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Vanterpool, 394 F.2d 697 (2nd Cir.
Posey v. United States, 416 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1968); Green v. United States, 386 F.2d 953 (10th Cir.
1969); United States v. Manglona, 414 F.2d 642 (9th 1967). The test is whether the words in the context used,
considering the age, background, and intelligence of the
Ci-. 1969); Freije v. United States, 408 F.2d 100 (1st
Cir. 1969); Lucas v. United States, 408 F.2d 835 (9th individual being interrogated, impart a clear understanding of all his rights. Pettyjohn v. United States,
Cir. 1969).
4Prior to the initiation of any questioning, a suspect 419 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Coyote v. United States,
is entitled to be warned that he has the right to remain 380 F.2d 305 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 992
silent, that anything he says can be used against him (1967). As curious as it may seem, this warning, now so
in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence necessary, was the basis on which a confession was once
of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney, excluded by the English courts. See Regina v. Harris,
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning 1 Cox C.C. 106 (1884); Regina v. Furley, 1 Cox C.C. 76
if he so desires. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, (1884).
6384 U.S. at 476.
444, 467-75 (1966).
6347 U.S. 62 (1954).
In evaluating the validity and sufficiency of a given
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The prosecution was then permitted to introduce
the evidence obtained from the earlier search and
seizure solely to impeach the defendant's credibility. On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court,
dismissed the petitioner's contention that the
introduction of illegally obtained evidence for
impeachment purposes contravened the exclu-

sionary rule of Weeks v. United States:7
It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the
defendant can turn the illegal method by which
evidence in the Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself
with a shield against the contradiction of his untruths. Such an extension of the Weeks doctrine
would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment.8
The Walder rationale was eagerly embraced
and expanded by the federal courts to cover cases
involving the use for impeachment purposes of
intangible evidence obtained in violation of the
McNabb-Mallory doctrine. 9 However, with the
coming of Miranda, doubts arose regarding the
continued viability of Walder. Today the shadows
of controversy are lengthening. While both the
federal ' 0 and state" courts are divided on the issue,
7232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Weeks, the Court held that
evidence seized during an illegal search in violation of
the fourth amendment was inadmissible in a federal
court. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920), expanded the Weeks doctrine to prohibit the derivative use of evidence acquired during an
illegal search and seizure.
8 Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
9United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904 (2nd Cir),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966); Inge v. United States,
356 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1966); White v. United States,
349 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Bailey v. United States,
328 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Johnson v. United
States, 344 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Tate v. United
States, 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Lockley v.
United States, 270 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Statements obtained in violation of the fifth or sixth amendments would appear to stand on no different footing
than those obtained in violation of the McNabb-

Mallory rule.

10Five Circuit Courts of Appeal have expressly held
that Walder has been overruled by Miranda at least
insofar as the former applies to Miranda violations:
Bosley v. United States, 426 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); Fox v. United States 403 F.2d 97 (2nd Cir.
1968); United States v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470 (3rd Cir.
1968); Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th
Cir. 1968); Wheeler v. United States, 382 F.2d 998
(10th Cir. 1967) (dictum). See also, United States v.
Birrell, 276 F. Supp. 798, 817 (S.D. N.Y, 1967) (dictum)
(in which the court questions the vitality of Walder
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commentators have concluded that Miranda has
sub silentio overruled Walder, or at least seriously
brought its rationale into question."
even in fourth amendment cases); United States v.
Prebish, 290 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.Fla. 1968). But compare
Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819, 822 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (Tamm, J., dissenting); United States v. Fox, 403
F.2d 97, 105 (2nd Cir. 1968) (Moore, J., dissenting);
Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172, 180 (9th Cir.
1968) (Byrne, J., dissenting). Fernandez v. Delgado,
257 F.Supp. 673 (D.Puerto Rico 1966).
The Fifth Circuit, while not deciding the issue, has
indicated in dictum that Walder may have been weakened by Miranda:
Finally we point out that the testimony of the
agents as to appellant's statement ....on the
afternoon of the robbery is suspect for the same
reasons as his prior explanation regarding the presence of the toy gun in his car. In determining their
admissibility in the retrial, the judge should consider the continued validity of Walder v. United
States, in light of the language in Miranda, as
extremely questionable.
Agius v. United States, 413 F.2d 915, 920 (5th Cir.
1969). This statement must, however, be considered in
conjunction with the same court's later decision in
Lewis v. Insurance Co. of North America, 416 F.2d
1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 1969):
We do not face and do not decide the question
whether this statement, or any part of it, would be
admissible for impeachment purposes in a criminal
prosecution. This is a complicated question which
Mirandahas influenced but did not decide.
n Six states have applied Walder to Miranda situations: State v. Howard, 182 Neb. 411, 155 N.W.2d 339
(1967); Serrano v. State, 447 P.2d 497 (Nev. 1968);
State v. Kimbrough, 109 N.J.Super. 57, 269 A.2d 232
(1970); People v. Brodie, 26 N.Y.2d 779, 257 N.E.2d
657, 309 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1970); People v. Harris, 25
N.Y.2d 175, 250 N.E.2d 349, 303 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1969);
People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 221 N.E.2d 541, 274
N.Y.S.2d 873 (1966); State v. Butler, 119 Ohio St.2d 55,
249 N.E.2d 818 (1969); State v. Brewster, 75 Wash.2d
137, 449 P.2d 685 (1969); State v. McClung, 66 Wash.2d
654, 404 P.2d 460 (1965) (en banc), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
1013 (1966). Cf. State v. Jackson, 201 Kan. 795, 443
P.2d 279, 282 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969).
See also People v. Marsh, 14 Mich.App. 518, 536, 65
N.W.2d 853, 863 (1968) (Sullivan, J., dissenting); State
v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 246, 422 P.2d 581, 583, cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967) (Perry, Holman, O'Donnell,

J.J., dissenting).

The Illinois Supreme Court has expressed "no opinion
as to the permissibility of the use of testimony volunteered by defendant [on his direct examination] and
unrelated to the suppressed confession." People v. Luna,
37 Ill.2d 299, 308, 226 N.E.2d 586, 590 (1967). The
Illinois Appellate Court has indicated that Walder's
validity has not been eroded by Miranda.See People v.
LaBatt, 108 fll.App.2d 18, 246 N.E.2d 845 (1969).
Ten state courts have refused to follow Walder in
cases involving Miranda violations: People v. Gardner,
71 Cal. Rptr. 568,266 Cal. App.2d 19 (1968); Velande v.
People, -Colo.-, 466 P.2d 919 (1970); State v.
Galasso, 217 So. 326 (Fla. 1968); Franklin v. State, 6
Md. App. 572, 252 A.2d 487 (1969); People v. Marsh,
14 Mich. App. 518, 65 N.W.2d 853 (1968); State v.
Catrett, 276 N.C. 86, 171 S.E.2d 398 (1970); State v.
Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 422 P.2d 581, cert. denied, 387
U.S. 943 (1967); Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa.

IMPEACHING THE PERJUROUS DEFENDANT
Objections to extending the Walder rationale to
embrace situations in which violations of Miranda
are involved have been predicated on three
grounds: (1) the exclusionary rule fashioned by
Miranda expressly forbids the use of statements
obtained in violation of its commands for impeachment purposes as well as case-in-chief purposes;'
(2) the Walder principle will encourage police
officers to violate Miranda in order to obtain evidence for impeachment purposes and thus runs
afoul of Miranda's deterrence purpose; and (3)
Walder unconstitutionally inhibits defendants from
taking the stand and testifying in their own behalf.
While even the slightest departure from Miranda'sedicts will render the evidence so obtained
inadmissible in the government's case-in-chief,13
it is submitted that considerations of policy and
justice demand that the exclusionary rule of
Miranda,like its fourth amendment counterpart, 4
admit of an impeachment exception in those instances where a defendant takes the stand in his
own behalf and, under direct examination, commits
perjury. 5 In such a case, the prosecution should be

allowed to impeach the testimony even with improperly obtained evidence so long as it is volunH 17
tary, reliable,1 and related only collaterally
to
the case.
16 The degree of reliability of the evidence is of salient
importance in determining whether or not the prosecution should be allowed to use the tainted evidence to
impeach. Certainly, tangible evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is irrefragably reliable.
Thus, not to allow such evidence for impeachment
would allow and encourage perjury by the defendant.
The "integrity" of our judicial system demands that
this not be tolerated. Since intangible evidence clearly
does not possess the same degree of reliability as tangible
evidence, courts must take care to see that the impeaching evidence is, in fact, reliable:
It is true that if a prior admission were found to
be unconstitutionally coerced, the substantial
probability that the admission is no more reliable
than the contrary testimony of the accused at trial
should lead a court to proceed with caution in permitting its use for impeachment purposes. [cite
omitted] But where... there is no good reason to
believe that a prior inconsistent statement was not
accurate and voluntary,... the Walder principle
[should be] controlling.
United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 912 (2nd Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966).
Surely, not all statements obtained in violation of
Mirandafail to possess the requisite degree of reliability
229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968); Cardwell v. Commonwealth, and voluntariness so that they must be excluded from
209 Va. 412, 164 S.E.2d 699 (1968); Gaertner v. State, evidence when offered for impeachment rather than for
case-in-chief purposes. Indeed, Miranda itself recog35 Wis.2d 159, 150 N.W.2d 370 (1967).
The United States Court of Military Appeals has nized that statements may, in fact, be voluntary alheld that statements obtained in violation of Miranda though improperly obtained. See 384 U.S. at 457. Cf.
are not available for impeachment purposes. United Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966). In
States v. Lincoln, 17 U.S.M.A. 330, 38 C.M.R.128 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 754 (1970), the
Court recognized that the atmosphere of a police station
(1967).
1 Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revised is not necessarily coercive. See also R. TRAYNOit, THE
DEvILs oF Dup PRocEss IN CRIINxAL DETECTioN,
and Shepardized, 56 CALm. L. Rxv. 579, 630 (1968);
Comment, The Collateral Use Doctrinefrom Walder to DETENTION AND T1UA. 36 n.86 (1966).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has implicitly
Miranda, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 912 (1968); Comment,
The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules, recognized the distinction between statements which are
inadmissible
because involuntarily and those which are
34 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 939 (1967); Kent, Miranda v.
Arizona-The Use of InadmissibleEvidencefor Impeach- inadmissible merely because obtained in violation of
Miranda:
ment Purposes, 18 WEsTERN Rms. L.Rxv. 1177 (1967);
We understand the trial judge's' ruling [which
Note, New York's Decision to Allow Impeachment in
excluded certain statementsl to have been based
Order to Find Truth, 13 N.Y.L.F. 148 (1967).
solely upon the absence of warnings. If there were
13384 U.S. at 476. However, where a suspect is known
reason to suspect that the statement was otherwise
to have an attorney or to have ample funds to secure
defective, e.g., that it was involuntary, the case
one, failure to tell a suspect that if he is indigent, a
would present a different question than that with
lawyer will be appointed free of charge to represent him
which we are faced here.
will not require application of Miranda'sexclusionary
Lewis v. Insurance Co. of North America, 416 F.2d
rule. 384 U.S. at 473 n. 43.
14See note 47 infra.
1077, 1080 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Byrd v. Wain1s It is essential that the defendant initiate the perwright, 428 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1970). Cf. United
jury in his direct examination. The prosecution, on States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415, 417 (3rd Cir. 1970).
cross-examination, cannot ask a leading question de- Dimmick v. State, 75 Alaska Rep. 21, 473 P.2d 616
signed to elicit a statement contrary to that made to the (1970). But see State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 244, 422
police. Such a question is improper, and the prosecution P.2d 581, 582, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967). ("IT]his
cannot thereafter impeach with the illegally obtained dichotomy does not appeal to us as constitutionally
evidence. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). meaningful.")
Thus, a mere violation of Miranda does not mean
Nor can the prosecution go beyond the scope of the
direct examination and attempt to elicit statements at that statements obtained are involuntary. The courts
variance with those given at the interrogation stage of must examine the evidence to determine if it is volunthe proceedings. See United States v. Pinto, 394 F.2d tary and reliable. However, once determined to be so, it
470, 475 (3rd Cir. 1968); People v. Rahming, 26 N.Y.2d should be admissible for impeachment on "collateral"
411, 259 N.E.2d 727 311 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1970); People v. matters in order to prevent perjury. Admittedly, this
Miles, 23 N.Y.2d 527, 245 N.E.2d 688, 297 N.Y.S.2d will require the courts to undertake certain factual assessments which Miranda does not allow when the
913 (1969).
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MIRANDA DOES NOT REQuIRE TOTAL ExcLusION
OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION
OF Ivs RULEs
Speaking for the majority in Miranda, Chief
Justice Warren said:
[N]o distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be
merely 'exculpatory.' If a statement made were in
evidence is sought to be introduced in the case-in-chief.
However, merely because Miranda sought to obviate
the ad hoc determination of the voluntariness of statements given during custodial interrogation in one instance, it does not ineluctably follow that the same
policy must be adopted in all others. It is one thing to
exclude improperly obtained statements from the casein-chief; it is quite another to exclude them when a
defendant attempts to commit perjury, for the interests
and considerations involved differ markedly.
Where a defendant takes the stand and asserts that
his trial testimony does not vary from the statements he
made to the police, almost all courts agree that the improperly obtained statements are admissible for impeachment purposes. See United States v. Fioravanti,
412 F.2d 407, 413 (3rd Cir. 1969); Fowle v. United
States, 410 F.2d 48, 55 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Fox, 403 F.2d 697, 699, 700-01 (2nd Cir. 1968); United
States v. Armetta, 378 F.2d 658 (2nd Cir. 1967); Hunt
v. Cox, 312 F. Supp. 637, 641-42 (E.D.Va. 1970); People v. LaBatt, 108 Ill.App. 2d 18, 246 N.E.2d 845
(1969); State v. Kimbrough, 109 N.J.Super. 57, 269
A.2d 232 (1970), Cf. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S.
148, 154-55 (1957). But see People v. Marsh, 14 Mich.
App. 518, 65 N.W.2d 853 (1968).
17 It is essential that the impeaching testimony not be
directly related to the case. Determination of what is
collateral may not be easy for courts to make, but it
does not present difficult theoretical problems. Nor can
it be said that the distinction is "virtually unworkable."
State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 246, 422 P.2d 581, 583,
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967). Indeed, it was not
until Miranda that some courts found the distinction
difficult to administer. Prior to Miranda, a number of
cases had successfully dealt with the problem. In addition to the cases cited in note 9 supra, see Dillion v.
United States, 391 F.2d 433 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 825 (1968).
While a rule of automatic exclusion may eliminate
difficulties and complications it scarcely accords with
the principle that:
The civilized conduct of criminal trials cannot be
confined within mechanical rules. It necessarily
demands the authority of limited direction entrusted to the judge presiding in Federal trials, including a well-established range of judicial discretion, subject to appropriate review on appeal, in
ruling upon preliminary questions of fact. Such a
system as ours must, within the limits here indicated, rely on the learning, good sense, fairness and
courage of federal trial judges.
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 342 (1939).
This view was reaffirmed in McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 346-47 (1943).
Further, these objections, based as they are on
grounds of expediency, must be rejected, for "[i]f justice
requires the fact to be alcertained, the difficulty of
doing so is no ground for refusing to try." 0. W.
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fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never
be used by the prosecution. In fact, statements
merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant
are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or
to demonstrate untruths in the statement given
under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by
implication. These statements are incriminating
in any meaningful sense of the word and may not
be used without the full warnings and effective
waiver required for any other statement.Y
A literal parsing of that language does seem to
support those courts which have felt themselves
impelled to conclude that Miranda has sounded
the death knell for Walder. 9 However, to paraphrase one of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's happy
aphorisms, the notion that because the words of an
opinion are plain, its meaning is also plain, is
pernicious oversimplication, 2 for "[lt is part of
wisdom, particularly for judges, not to be victimized by words." n And since words acquire scope
and function from the history of events which they
summarize, courts must take care not to isolate a
HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAw 48 (Howe ed. 1963)"
Indeed, the notion that Walder should be abolished
because of the burden on the system contravenes the
principle that the despatch of judicial business is less
imperative than the protection of the public interest.
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932);
Insurance Group. Comm. v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R..
329 U.S. 607, 631 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting),
Cf. Groppi v. Leslie, -F.2d-(7th Cir. 1970), aff'd. en
banc-F.2d- (1971).
Finally, the position taken by the court in Johnson v.
United States, 344 F.2d 163, 165 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
that the question of collateralness was not considered
by Walder, must be rejected. The case was argued by
Paul Porter of the prominent Washington firm of
Arnold, Fortas, and Porter. An examination of his brief
reveals that counsel indeed called the rule against impeachment on collateral matters to the Court's attention. Among the authorities cited in that brief was
United States v. Klass, 166 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1948)
which held that "the answer of the witness on crossexamination with respect to a collateral matter introduced for impeachment purposes concluded the
inquiry." Id. at 376-77. Walder clearly rejected this
evidentiary argument. Moreover, invocation of the rule
is a matter of discretion for the court. Socony Vacuum
Oil Co. v. United States, 310 U.S. 150,230 (1939).
18 384 U.S. at 476-77.
11See cases cited notes 10-11 supra.
20See United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also, Guiseppi
v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2nd Cir. 1944) (L. Hand,
J., concuring), aff'd. sub norn., Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling,
324 U.S. 244 (1945). While these cases dealt with statutory construction, their underlying principles apply,
paripassu, to the interpretation of judicial opinions.
21 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 56 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Holmes once
cautioned that "[w]e must think things not words...."
Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV.
L. REV. 443, 460 (1899).
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few words from the underlying rationale of an
opinion. In sum, the question presented is not
what do the above cited words of Miranda say,
but rather what do they meap.
Even from the most laconic reading of Miranda,
it is clear that the question relating to the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence for impeachment purposes was not before the Court; and it is
submitted that the Court did not pretend to deal
with it.n The Chief Justice's single, oblique, loosely
phrased reference to impeachment was designed
to bolster an eradication of the difference between
inculpatory and exculpatory statements; it was
not designed to overrule Wakier sub silentio.2
The statement of the Chief Justice that "[tihe
warnings required and the waiver necessary in ac-

to the claim that prior inconsistent statements
illegally obtained cannot be used even for impeachment purposes. An equally unequivocal statement
was made years earlier in Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States,2 5 where Mr. Justice Holmes stated
that
the essence of a provision forbidding acquisition
of evidence in a certain way is not merely that
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the
Court but that it shall not be used at all.26

The Walder Court found Silverthorne's words a
prophecy to inspire rather than an immutable command to be slavishly obeyed without regard to
the attendent circumstances. Hence, it modified
the rule in accordance with the lessons of expericordance with our opinion today are ... prereqence.F If Silverthorne's seemingly irrecrusable
isites to the admissibility of any statement made
statement
admits of exceptions, there is every
by a defendant," 2 4 does, perhaps, lend plausibility
reason to suppose that the Chief Justice's state22Prior to Miranda, a disturbingly large number of ment in Mirandadoes so as well.
cases had come before the Court dramatically revealing
In fact, such a supposition mirrors the oft-rethe evils that can arise from unsupervised incommunicado interrogation. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, peated and consistently followed principle of
367 U.S. 568 (1961); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 constitutional adjudication that the Court does
(1954); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1947); Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, "not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
322 U.S. 143 (1944); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 than is required by the precise facts presented in
(1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See the record." 2 Indeed, Chief Justice Warren himself
also Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957);
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). It was has warned against gratuitous innuendos and
against this background that Miranda came to the expressions of opinion on matters not before the
Court. Certiorari was granted in Miranda "in order to Court. He has expressed,
on more than one ocfurther explore some facets of the problems thus exposed
by Escobedo v. Illinois ... of applying the privilege casion, his awareness that the experience of cenagainst self-incrimination to in-custody interroga- turies is behind the wisdom of not deciding,
tion. ... " 384 U.S. at 441. The Court was concerned
with the "interrogation atmosphere and the evils it can either explicitly or by "atmospheric pressure,"
bring." Id. at 456. It sought to find "a protective device matters that do not come to the Court with the
to dispel the compelling atmosphere of the interroga- impact of necessity.29
tion", and it attempted to advance "proper limitation[s]
25 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
on custodial interrogation" in order to insure that "pro26
tracted questioning incommunicado in order to extort
1 d. at 392.
confessions" and other practices of that nature would
2 See Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Crimibe eliminated. Id. at 446-65.
nal Procedure, 53 CA ir. L. REv. 929, 952-53 (1965).
Egalitarianism also seemed to play a part in the deci21Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598,
sion. The Court stressed that not only the cases before 6032 (1968) (Warren, C. J., dissenting).
9See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 635-36
it, but the vast majority of confession cases with which
it had dealt in the past involved those unable to retain (1961) (Warren, C. J., concurring):
counsel. Thus, to implement the fifth amendment's
It has not been the custom of the Court, in decidguarantee, Miranda required counsel for the indigent
ing the cases which come before it, to write lengthy
suspect. In this way, the Court attempted to insure that
and abstract dissertations upon questions which
the fifth amendment's application to the poor would be
are neither presented by the record nor necessary
more than "a promise to the ear to be broken to the
to a proper disposition of the issue raised.
hope, a teasing illusion like a munificient bequest in a
pauper's will." Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186
I would prefer not to write on many of the
(1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
difficult questions which the opinion discussed until
23Had the majority intended to make inroads on
the facts of a particular case make such writing
WaIder, it is unlikely that the four dissenters, (one of
necessary. In my view, the reasons which have comwhom, Clark, J., was in the majority in Walder) would
pelled the Court to develop the law on a case-byhave made no protest. And it is unlikely that the Chief
case approach, to declare legal principles only in the
Justice, who was in the majority in Walder, would have
context of specific factual situations, and to avoid
been so cavalier in laying to rest one of his own offexpounding more than is necessaryfor the decision of
spring.
a case are persuasive.
24384 U.S. at 476.
(emphasis added). See also Grosso v. United States, 390
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The Court's sensitivity to these principles is
illustrated by two significant cases. In Roth v.
United States,3" the Court declared, seemingly
without qualification, that obscenity is not protected by the first amendment. Looking solely to
the language of the case, it would appear that a
state can lawfully punish private possession of
obscene matter. InStanley v. Georgia,n the validity
of a statute penalizing such possession was challenged on first amendment grounds. The Court's
analysis is instructive here:
It is true that Roth does declare, seemingly without qualification, that obscenity is not protected
by the First Amendment. That statement has
been repeated in various forms in subsequent
cases.... However, neither Roth nor any subse-

quent decision of this Court dealt with the precise
problem involved in the present case....
None of the statements cited by the Court in
Roth for the proposition that this Court has always
assumed that obscenity is not protected by the
freedoms of speech and press were made in the
context of a statute punishing mere prevate possession of obscene material .... Indeed, with one

exception, we have been unable to discover any case
in which the issue in the present case has been fully
considered.
In this context, we do not believe that this case
can be decided simply by citing Roth."
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Miranda to retrials. The issue simply was not
presented." 11
What emerges with unmistakable clarity is an
injunction against the "tyranny of literalness."7
For, by yielding to this "tyranny," courts create
their own verbal prisons. 8 Care must be taken to
avoid applying a given fact situation to a rule
without regard to the reasons that brought the rule
into existence.' 9 It is unfortunate that those courts
which have found the language of Miranda so
imperious did not more fully consider that the
rules laid down by the Court were wrought under
the pressure of a particular factual setting which
was in no way related to the doctrinal underpin40
nih gs of Walder.
Finally, the most cogent evidence that Miranda
did not pro tanto overrule Walder appears in Harrison v. United States.0 In his dissent, Mr. Justice
36Id. at 216.
37 United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 199
(1957).

38See Sullivan v. Behimer, 363 U.S. 335, 358 (1960)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
39See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114
(1934). (Cardozo, J.) Cf. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's
commentary in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 399 (1821):

It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general
expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in
connection with the case in which those expression

are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be

respected, but ought not to control the judgment in
In Johnson v. New Jersey,n the Court determined
a subsequent suit when the very point is presented
for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious.
that Miranda should not be applied retroactively.
The question actually before the court is investiLooking solely to the language in Johnson, the
gated with care, and considered in its full extent.
federal appellate courts asserted that Miranda
Other principles which may serve to illustrate it,
are considered in their relation to the case decided,
must be applied to retrials as well as original
but their possible bearing on all other cases is seltrials.34 The issue finally came before the Supreme
dom completely investigated.
40The foregoing argument has assumed that the
Court in Jenkins v. Delaware. The Court rejected
to impeachment in Miranda was
majority's
the holdings of the lower courts, saying that, "in not dictum.reference
The contention is not that the Court went
[Johnson] we did not consider the applicability of beyond the facts of the case in announcing a principle;
but rather that, when considered in context, the referU.S. 62, 83(1968) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Sherman ence to impeachment takes on a different complexion
v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1957) (Warren, than it does when isolated. Assuming, arguendo, that
CJ.)
the reference is dictum, it must still be rejected, for the
It has been noted that "Warren can put out a princi- distinction between decision and dicta is a sine qua non
ple as broad as all outdoors, and then disregard it in the of constitutional adjudication. Distinguishing between
next case, as soon as one touch of phrasing proves un- dicta and decision, between what was said and what was
comfortable." See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMxON LAW done, is nothing less than distinguishing between ratiTRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 387 (1960). Thus, it is ocination on the one hand and naked conclusions on the
not without ironic significance that the Chief Justice in
Culombe was chiding Justice Frankfurter, the Court's
staunchest supporter of "Judicial Restraint."
30354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).

1394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
Id. at 560-63 (footnotes omitted).
384 U.S. 719, 721 (1966).
3'United States v. Phillips, 401 F.2d 301, 306 (7th
Cir. 1968); United States v. Young, 388 F.2d 675 (9th
Cir. 1968); Virgin Islands v. Lovell, 378 F.2d 799, 802
n. 4 (3rd Cir. 1967).
2

1

35 U.S. 213 (1969).

other. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155
(1968); Bisso v. Inland Waterway Corp., 349 U.S. 85,
100 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United Gas
Co. v. Texas, 303 U.S. 123, 144 (1938); Dayton Power
and Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n. of Ohio, 292
U.S. 290, 302 (1934); Washington v. Dawson & Co.,
264 U.S. 219, 228, 236 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See generally B. CAn.Dozo, Ta GROWTH OF a LAW,
138 (1924); B. CARDozo, Tan NATURE OF TaE JuDIcIAL
PRoCEss, 29-30 (1921).
41392 U.S. 219 (1968).
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White expressed concern over Harrison'spotential
effect upon the use of unlawfully obtained evidence for impeachment purposes:
And, as a final consequence, today's decision would
seem to bar the use of confessions defective under
Miranda or Mallory from being used for impeachment when a defendant takes the stand and deliberately lies.' 2
Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority,
responded:
And, contrary to the suggestion made in a dissenting opinion today,... we decide here only a case
in which the prosecution illegally introduced the
defendant's confession in evidence against him at
trial in its case-in-chief. 43
By necessary implication, Harrison demonstrated
that the Court did not consider its decision in
Miranda to have affected the Walder exception to
the exclusionary rules. Of the arguments which
have relied so heavily on Miranda, no dearer
refutation can be envisaged.
THE IMPECMrENT EXCEPTION To THE EXCLusioNARy RULES WILL NOT ENCOURAGE
POLICE MISCONDUCT

"Liability," Dewey tells us, "is the beginning
of responsibility. .... The individual is held ac-

countable for what he has done in order that he
may be responsive in what he is going to do."'
Only thus do people gradually "learn by dramatic
imitation to hold themselves accountable, and
liability becomes a voluntary deliberate acknowlown, that their conseedgment that deeds are our
45
quences come from us."
Echoes and applications of this salutary rule of
morals are also found in the law. Indeed, in the
context of the criminal law, experience seems to
have taught that the rule excluding evidence
seized in violation of the fourth and fifth amendments 46 is the only effective deterrent to police
42 Id. at 234
43
Id.at 223 n. 9.
4

J. DEwEv, Morals and Conduct, in J. CuIMNs &
R. LINSCOTT, MAN AN MAN: THE SociAL PHILosoPaxas 484-85 (1954).

45Id.at 484-85
6See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724 (1969);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968); Harrison v.
United States, 392 U.S. 219, 224 n. 10 (1968); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 217 (1960); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62,
64-65 (1954); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Weeks v. United States,

misconduct.0 By. removing the incentive to disregard these constitutional guarantees, the exclu232 U.S. 383, 391-93 (1914). See generally J. MAGUIRE,
167 passint (1959).
Unlike the rule excluding evidence seized in violation
of the fourth amendment, the rule excluding involuntary confessions was not from its inception recognized
as the principal mode of discouraging lawless police
conduct. Involuntary confessions were originally excluded because their intrinsic trustworthiness was
suspect. 3 J. WIouoRx, EVIDENCE §822 (3rd ed. 1940).
Gradually, however, the emphasis shifted from the
trustworthiness of the confession to the methods by
which it was obtained. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315 (1959); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
Illinois Supreme Court Justice Walter Schaeffer noted:
The confession case culminated in Rogers v. Richmond, [365 U.S. 534 (1961)], in which the Court rejected the traditional concern for trustworthiness
and held that an involuntary confession is excluded
to deter undesirable police behavior and to maintain the accusatorial nature of our judicial system.
W. SCHAEFFER, THE SUSPECT AaN SociETY 15 (1966).
See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
While the rule excluding "involuntary" confessions is,
in light of Miranda, now predicated upon the fifth
amendment, its raison d'91re does not appear to differ
from that announced in the later confession cases. Prior
to Miranda, the rule excluding such confessions did not
trace its lineage to the fifth amendment. That the rule
and the privilege had wholly distinct origins was demonstrated by Wigmore. See 3 J. WimoGRE, EviDENCE
§2266 (McNaughton ed. 1961); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (Harlan, Stewart, White, JJ.,
dissenting). Indeed both Miranda and Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) indicated that Mirandawas
chiefly concerned with proscribing interrogation practices which the Court found to be "destructive of human
dignity," and "at odds with one of our Nation's most
cherished principles-that the individual may not be
compelled to incriminate himself." 384 U.S. at 457-58.
Since the majority believed that "'IT]he quality of a
nation's civilization can be largely measured by the
methods it used in the enforcement of its criminal law,' "
it was convinced that unsupervised and unregulated interrogations were inconsistent with the boast that ours
in an accusatorial and not an inquisitional system. Id.
at 480.
In conclusion, Miranda sought to advance "proper
limitation[s] upon custodial interrogation" to insure
that "protracted questioning incommunicado in order
to extort confessions" and other "practices of this sort
will be eradicated in the foreseeable future." Id. at 44647. Thus it is submitted that Miranda's exclusionary
rule, like its antecedent and its fourth amendment
counterpart is designed to discourage official misconduct by depriving the government of the fruits of its
lawlessness.
4*The California Supreme Court expressed this view
in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905,
911-912 (1955):
Despite the persuasive force of the foregoing arguments [in support of the traditional common law
admitting evidence even though illegally obtained],
we have concluded.., that evidence obtained in
violation of constitutional guarantees is inadmisisble.... We have been compelled to reach that conclusion because other remedies have completely
failed to secure compliance with the constitutional
provisions on the part of police officers with the
EVIDENCE OF GUILT
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sionary rule seeks to discourage pernicious police
practices which are obnoxious to a free society.
Those who contend that Walder should be overruled, or at least not extended to Miranda situations, have sought comfort in the philosophy of
the exclusionary rule. They contend that police
misconduct will be encouraged if statements obtained in violation of Miranda are admissible to
impeach the testimony of a perjurous defendant.
The argument rests on the assumption that the
police will consciously violate Miranda in an attempt to obtain incriminating statements which
the prosecution can use for impeachment notwithstanding their knowledge that these statements will be inadmissible in the case-in-chief.
Illustrative is the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in State v. Brewton:4
If we should today adopt a restrictive application
of the exclusionary rule, the result could be a
major step backward. This court would, in effect,
be saying to the overzealous that police officers
will be free in the future to interrogate suspects
secretly, at arms length, without counsel, and
without advice, so long as they use means consistent with threat-or-promise voluntariness, and
so long as they understand that they may file the
information only for use to keep the defendant
honest. Thus, the police could, at their option,
take a calculated risk: By giving up the possibility
of using the suspect's statements in the state's
case, they could obtain by unconstitutional means
and store away evidence to use if the defendant
should elect upon trial to take the stand.
As will be seen, Brewton is a classic example of
what can happen when a court eschews careful
analysis in the mistaken assumption that its conclusions are self-evident and self-authenticating.
And it amply confirms the wisdom of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's observation that the reasoning which
attendant result that the courts under the old rule
have been constantly required to participate in, and
in effect condone, the lawless activities of law enforcement officers.
See also United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 499
(2nd Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.); Nuelstein v. District of
Columbia, 115 F.2d 690, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1940). The
fourth amendment exclusionary rule was ultimately
imposed upon the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). The deterrence argument, however, is not
universally accepted. For an exhaustive empirical
study of the efficacy of the exclusionary rule, see, Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,

37 U. Cm. L. R-v. 665 (1970).
48247 Ore. 241, 245, 422 P.2d 581, 583, cert. denied,
387 U.S. 943 (1967). See also Groshart v. United States,
392 F.2d 172, 180 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Prebish, 290 F.Supp. 268 (S.D.Fla. 1968).
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justifies a conclusion should be made manifest in
the judicial opinion in which it is announced. 5
Brewton boldly assumes that police might gamble. They might refrain from offering a suspect the
Mirandawarnings and thereby surrender the possibility of using subsequent statements in the
prosecution's case-in-chief in order to obtain such
statements for impeachment purposes should the
defendant elect upon trial to take the stand."
The Brewton court's assertion is speculative in
the extreme, and it is a commonplace that tendentious speculations will not solve problems with
intractable variables such as arise under the exclusionary rule. It will not do merely to say that police
officers might be encouraged to violate Miranda,
or that they could take a "calculated risk." The
focus of the inquiry must be more critical and
discerning if the facts are to bear a necessarily
close relation to reality.51 Thus, before the exclusionary rule can come into play, it must be shown
that there exists a substantial likelihood that by
extending Walder police will take the calculated
risk of which Brewton speaks. Mere possibilities
based on refined speculation will not suffice. 2
49Darr v. Burford, 339, U.S. 200, 255 (1949).
Another safeguard [against the courts injecting
their unconscious predilections into a decision]
is craftsmanship-the careful articulation of the
grounds of decision and a re-examination from
time to time of the assumptions on which rules
and doctrines rest. If the unexamined life is not
worth living, the unexamined premise is not
worth its implication.
Freund, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in W. MENDELSON,
Rsax:
A TRTruTE 161 (1964).
FEx FRANszu
50A thorough canvass of the reported cases belies
this assumption and reveals that the police have, for the
most part, lived up to Miranda's strictures. Furthermore, in light of the vast number of confessions that
occur subsequent to the receipt of the Miranda warnings, it is manifest that the officers' fidelity to Miranda
has not been rewarded with a pall of silence. Indeed, Mr.
Justice Clark has observed that "[clompliance with
Mirandadoes not result in the suspect 'clamming up'."
United States v. Jackson, 429 F.2d 1368, 1372 (7th Cir.
1970) (Clark, J. by designation). Moreover, Miranda
itself intimated that the experience of the F.B.I.
militated against the notion that silence was the inevitable consequence of warning. See also Study, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE
L.J. 1519(1967). Thus, the very foundation upon which
Brewton rests is defective because, given the fact that
the police are likely to receive post-warning information, it is highly doubtful that they would be willing to
take Brewton's "calculated risk."
51Cf. Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S.
344, 360 (1933); McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co.,
272 U.S. 400, 424 (1926) (Brandeis and Stone, JJ., dissenting).
6 Cf. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251
U.S. 417, 448 (1919); Wright v. Denn, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 204, 239 (1825).
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Indeed, the court did not, in any reasoned way,
deal with the various factors which a police officer
must evaluate and weigh prior to making the
decision whether to inform a suspect of his rights;
it merely announced a conclusion which on the
surface appears plausible. Whether the police will
take the "calculated risk" and forego the opportunity to obtain case-in-chief evidence in order to
get impeaching evidence depends upon the officers'
rational assessment of the total situation.
It follows that police must assess the possibility
that information obtained, if any, in the absence
of warnings will actually be available for use at
trial for impeachment purposes.5s That will depend upon whether five factors ultimately coalesce
at trial: (1) the defendant takes the stand: (2) the
defendant, in his direct examination, goes beyond
a mere denial of complicity in the crime; (3) the
prosecution decides to use the statements; (4) the
court determines that the statements do not bear
directly on the offense charged; and (5) the court
determines that the evidence is more probative
than prejudicial: Since any decision to consciously
seek impeachment evidence inust take account of
all these factors, the cognitive process which must
be employed is not as facile as Brewton would lead
one to believe.
Theoretically, it appears that the police will
take the "calculated risk" only where they can
rationally assume that the chances of the five
aforementioned factors coalescing at trial exceed
the chances that the suspect will stand mute if
given Mirandawarnings. Police are not so legally
sophisticated that they could actually engage in
such a cognitive process. However, Brewton's entire argument rests on the presumption, dearly
through implicitly expressed, that the police are so
knowledgeable. Indeed, the Brewton rationale
necessitated that assumption, for if the police do
not actually possess the acumen attributed to
them, the entire deterrence argument crumbles
under its own weight.
The likelihood that the police will obtain a
confession or admission from one whom they have
warned is infinitely greater than the likelihood that
statements obtained in the absence of warnings
will actually be available for use at trial. Thus, it
cannot realistically be supposed that a police
officer, no matter how venal he may be, will refrain
53Of course, this presupposes that without the warnings the suspect would be cooperative. This presupposition has little intrinsic merit when the police are dealing
with people who "know the ropes."

from giving Miranda warnings, thereby losing
important case-in-chief evidence in the vain hope
that in exchange he may obtain evidence bearing
solely on credibility. The contrary argument blinks
reality.
Judicial opinions are not fungible, each possessing equal intrinsic value. The worth of an opinion is
proportionate to the degree to which it commends
itself to reason and is consonant with the realities
of life." Measured against these principles, it is
submitted that Brewton should not be followed.
It is not, however, merely the fecklessness of
of Brewton's arguments which cautions against
restricting Walder; there are affirmative grounds
upon which to justify Walder's application to
Miranda."
To determine whether the directive force of a
precedent should be restricted, an analysis of its
function must be entertained, for a world cannot
be ran on the principles of formal logic. The test
of a rule's worth must be empirical in character.
It is necessary to study the social consequences of
the rule's application and deduce therefrom its
6
logic.
The seventeen year history of the Walder rule in
cases involving violations of the fourth amendment
represents a persuasive foundation for the claim
that its application to Miranda will not encourage
police misconduct. Walder has not diminished the
vitality of the protections afforded by the fourth
amendment's exclusionary rule. Nor has it motivated the police to violate the amendment's
precepts in order to gain incriminating evidence for
impeachment purposes. If Walder has not provided
the impetus for law enforcement officials to violate
the fourth amendment, it surely does not follow
that it will now provide the motive force for viola"iT]hat which makes no sense to the common
understanding surely is not required by any fictive
notions of law or even by the more sentimental attitude
toward criminals." Milanovich v. United States, 365
U.S. 551, 559-60 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Th arguments against Wader which have relied
on the deterrence rationale bear a similarity to arguments of an earlier day which sought to persuade the
courts that anything even remotely connected with
police illegality was "tainted." Insofar as it represents
the Supreme Court's attitude towards excessively
strained casuistic arguments, Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), is pertinent:
Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between information obtained through
illicit wire-tapping and the Government's proof.
As a matter of good sense, however, such connection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.
See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
51 See B. CAnozo, supra note 39 at 112, 116.
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tions of Miranda. Thus, the arguments based on
the deterrence rationale which have prophesized
dire consequences simply do not withstand the test
of experience, of all teacher's the most dependable.
The Supreme Court has left no doubt that courts
must look to such experience in determining the
propriety of a proposed application of the exclusionary rule. In Wolf v. Colorado,5 the Court held
that the right of privacy, vouchsafed by the fourth
amendment, was binding on the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
However, the federal exclusionary rule of Weeks
was held not to be part of the fourth amendment
and thus was not binding on the states. Only after
experience had proven that all other means of
protecting the right to privacy were worthless did
the Court finally impose the federal exclusionary
rule upon the states in Mapp v. Ohio:m
[W]e note that the second basis elaborated in Wolf
in support of its failure to enforce the exclusionary
rule against the States was that 'other means of
protection' have been afforded 'the Right to
privacy.' The experience of Californiathat such other
remedies have been worthless and futile is buttressed
by the experience of other States.
In Schwartz v. Texas,59 the Court held that evidence obtained in violation of Section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act6° was admissible in
state criminal proceedings. The hope was expressed
that enforcement of the statutory prohibition in
§605 could be achieved under the penal provisions
of the Act. But after sixteen years experience
proved that to be a vain hope, the federal exclusionary rule was made applicable to state criminal
proceedings in Lee v. Florida.61
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In Elkins v. United States,1 the issue before the
Court was whether evidence obtained by state
officers during a search, which if conducted by
federal officers would have violated the fourth
amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and
seizures, was admissible in a federal criminal trial.
Aware that resolution of the issues was not to be
dictated by "[ra]ere logical symmetry and abstract
reasoning," 6 the Court examined the experience of
the federal courts under the exclusionary rule
enunciated in Weeks v. United States." After considering the "impressive experience of the states"
and exhaustively examining the considerations of
federalism, the court held:
These then are the considerations of reason and
experience which point to the rejection of a doctrine that would freely admit in a federal trial
evidence seized by state agents in violation of the
65
defendant's constitutional rights.
Finally, the Court's opinion in Alderman v.
United States6" underscores the salient role of
experience in fashioning and applying exclusionary
rules. There the Court answered the contention
that the deterrence rationale logically dictates
that all evidence seized in violation of the fourth
amendment must be excluded regardless of whether
the evidence was seized from the defendant or from
another.
[No previous decisions of this Court] hold that
anything which deters illegal searches is thereby
commanded by the Fourth Amendment.... Without experience showing the contrary, we should not
assume that this new statute [outlawing unauthorized electronic surveillance] will be cavalierly disregarded or will not be enforced against transgressors. 67

Finally, our decision today is counseled by experience.... Research has failed to uncover a single
reported prosecution of a law enforcement officer
for violation of §605 since the statute was enacted.
We conclude, as we concluded in Elkins and in
Mapp, that nothing short of mandatory exclusion
of the illegal evidence will compel respect for the
federal law in the only effective available way-by
removing the incentive to disregard it.
6 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
5 367 U.S. 643, 652-53 (1961) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
59344 U.S. 199 (1952).

6°47 U.S.C. §605 (1964). This statute prohibits
divulging the contents of any interstate or foreign
communication by wire or.radio to persons other than
the addressee or his agent.
61392 U.S. 378, 381 (1968) (emphasis added).

Despite the improbability that Walder will encourage Miranda violations, concerned and chary
voices caution against the admittance of any unconstitutionally obtained evidence on the ground
364 U.S. 206 (1960).
63Id.

at 215-16.

64232 U.S. 383 (1914).
1364 U.S. at 222 (emphasis added).
66394 U.S. 165 (1969). In substance, the Alderman

defendants asserted an independent constitutional
right to have evidence excluded because it was seized
from another in violation of the fourth amandment.
The Court reaffirmed its rules relating to standing and
ruled that one cannot move to exclude evidence unless
his fourth amendment rights have been violated. See
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
67394 U.S. at 174-75 (emphasis added).
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that even "a slight incentive is apparently sufficient
to encourage the police to engage in illegal conduct." 8 It is important to the welfare of society
that in certain instances probative evidence,
unconstitutionally obtained, be excluded in order
to secure obedience to constitutional commands.
It is no less vital, however, that criminals be
brought to book, 9 and to that end, all available
68 Comment,
The Collateral Use Doctrine: From
Walder to Miranda, 62 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 912, 926-27
(1968):
If, however, the impeaching evidence is related to
the offense charged, the collateral use doctrine
does undercut the policy in question by providing
the police with an incentive to use illegal methods
in order to acquire evidence against the defendant.
In this regard it should be noted that a slight
incentive is apparently sufficient to encourage
the police to engage in illegal conduct.
This commentator contends that the collateral use
doctrine furnishes the requisits incentive for police
to violate Mirandain two ways:

The doctrine permits... illegally obtained evidence to be used to discredit the defendant's
testimony if he takes the stand. Alternatively,
the availability of such evidence discourages the
defendant from taking the stand.
Id. at 927. The first argument parallels that in Brewton
and has previously been answered. See notes 48-55
supra and accompanying text. The second argument
misses the mark, for the focus here is not on the dubious
tendency of the evidence once obtained, but on the
motivation of the police. Surely, one cannot realistically
contend that the police will forego the opportunity to
obtain an admissible confession in order to get collaterally impeaching evidence in the hope that the
defendant will thereby be discouraged from taking
the stand.
Another commentator has opted for a "complete
prohibition against use of all unlawfully obtained
evidence" in order to "remove all incentive for illegal
police behavior. The announcement of an absolute
rule may have psychological impact on the police, if
nothing else." Comment, The Impeachment Exception
to the Exclusionary Rules, 34 U. Cm. L. Rv. 939,
946 (1967). The author contended that:
...to keep the [Walder] exception for just the
limited situations where two prosecutions were
involved and the defendant made an unnecessarily
broad denial [as occurred in Walder] would burden
the judicial system with the cost of administering
a minor distinction in an area of law presently
overburdened with such technicalities.
Id. at 946. (emphasis added). See generally the authorities collected in Justice Fortas' dissenting opinion
in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 206.
It is not realistic to characterize the defendant's
perjury in Walder as an "unnecessarily broad denial."
Furthermore, one must possess the hardiest credulity
to accept the Supreme Court's limitation on the exclusionary rule as a "minor distinction." Whatever one's
view of the ultimate wisdom of Walder's determination
that an extension of the Weeks doctrine to allow a
defendant to affirmatively resort to perjurous testimony in reliance on the government's disability to
challenge his credibility would be "a perversion of the
Fourth Amendment," 347 U.S. at 65, few would deny
that
69 it is a good deal more than a "technicality."
1n the language of Mr. Justice Cardozo: "On

probative evidence should be employedY0 In its
attempts to come to grips with this antinomy, the
Supreme Court has left no doubt that the solution
lies not in the insensitive invocation of obdurate
rules or tests mechanical, for both objects of desire
can never be fully realized. Hence, some compromise is necessary lest "in the clash of jarring rivalries the pretending absolutes will destroy themselves and ordered freedom too." 71
In the final analysis, one principle emerges from
the cases: when the public interest in presenting all
evidence which is relevant and probative is compelling and the deterrent function served by exclusion is minimal, the exclusionary rule should not
be invoked. There is no adequate substitute for
this balancing test, anathema though it be to many.
To retreat from that delicate test in favor of a
rule of automatic exclusion whenever there exists
the slightest possibility of police misconduct would
be folly. For "it scarcely helps to give so wide a
berth to Charybdis' maw that one is in danger of
being impaled upon Scylla's rocks." 7
The Court had occasion to employ this test in
Alderman v. United StatesY It was there argued
that the deterrence rationale logically dictates
that all unconstitutionally obtained evidence be
excluded from criminal trials without regard to
whether the defendant had standing to complain
of the illegal activity. After balancing the competing considerations, the Court refused to extend the
exclusionary rule:
The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the police have violated
have been considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even though the
case against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. But we are
not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants
would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime
and having them acquitted or convicted on the
4
basis of all the evidence which exposes the truthY
the one side is the social need that crime shall be repressed. On the other, the social need that law shall
not be flouted by the insolence of office." People v.
Defore,
242 N.Y. 13, 24-25, 150 N.E. 585, 589 (1926).
70
See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165
(1969); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216
(1960).
n Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, in F. FRuAxNmruRT,
MR. JUsTICE HoLsS

12 (1931).

72Bank and Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d
167 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 836 (1947) (L.
Hand, J.).
"394
U.S. 165 (1969).
74
Id. at 174-75. Cf. Chapman v. California, 386
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Thus, even if it is conceded that a restriction
upon Walder will have some marginal deterrent
effect, it does not follow that courts are compelled
to adopt the rule of total exclusion advocated by
Brewton. Whatever minimal degree of deterrence
would be served by extending the exclusionary
rule is insufficient to override or justify further
encroachments upon the public interest in preventing those accused of crime from taking the
stand and committing perjury. To deny the prosecution the use of a defendant's voluntary, reliable,
prior inconsistent statements which relate only
collaterally to the offense charged and which can
be used only to impeach credibility is to trivialize
the very meaning of the exclusionary rules.
While the major thrust of the exclusionary rules
is a deterrent one, they have come to serve another
vital function-the "imperative of judicial integrity":
Courts which sit under our Constitution... will
not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such
75
invasions.
This doctrine received its explicit enunciation in
U.S. 18 (1967), where the Court promulgated a harmless constitutional error rule which recognized "that
there may be some constitutional errors which in the
setting of a particular case are so unimportant and
insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal
Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the
automatic reversal of conviction." Id. at 22. However,
once a constitutional infraction has been shown, the
government must "prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained." Id. at 24. The Chapman rule was
designed to obviate reversal as a mandatory remedy
in cases involving errors of constitutional dimension
and to substitute judgment for the a priori application
of a rule of automatic reversal which was but an unnecessary concession to technicality and thus wholly
antithetical to a jurisprudence of conceptions.
Yet it has been argued that the "harmless" error
violates the deterrence rationale. The proponents
contended that some police would violate constitutional
standards in the hope that the trial judge would erroneously admit the evidence obtained and that an
appellate court will find the error harmless.
The decision in Chapman recognized that the increment to deterrence of improper police practices
which would result from a rule of automatic reversal
would be negligible, and, in any event, was far outweighed by the need for a harmless constitutional
error rule.
71 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968). See also
Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 385-86 (1968); Harrison v.
United States, 392 U.S. 219, 224 n. 10 (1968); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 321 (1942). Compare Zap v. United
States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946).
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Elkins v. United States;76 however, its roots extend
to Justice Holmes and Brandeis' dissents in Olinstead v. United States.7 Relying on Elkins, it has
been argued that Walder violates the imperative of
judicial integrity.
The phrase "imperative of judicial integrity"
is an excellent example of the extent to which uncritical reliance on tidy formulas bedevils the law.
The phrase began in Elkins as a literary expression; its very felicity thereafter threatened to
establish it as dogma. However, it is clear that

the Court did not conceive of the cunningly
wrought phrase as a shibboleth to be inflexibly
applied as though it contained its own meaning.h
364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)
- 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928). Justice Holmes dissented on the non-constitutional ground that "the
government ought not to use evidence obtained, and
only obtainable, by a criminal act." Id. at 469-70.
In the intimacy of the personal correspondence of
Justice Holmes, there is a glimpse of some of the factors
which shaped the dissent. On June 20, 1928, Holmes
wrote to his revered friend, Sir Frederick Pollock:
Beverly Farms, June 20, 1928
My dear young Frederick:
It is good to see your handwriting again and to
welcome you back from your youthful larks-my
time for them has gone by. The fatigue of Washington to Boston and Boston to Washington is
enough for me, and I walk very little. I am interested by what you tell of Charybdis and the truant
Scylla. I dissented in the case of tapping telephone
wires. The C. J. who wrote the prevailing opinion,
perhaps as a rhetorical device to obscure the
difficulty, perhaps merely because he did not note
the difference, which perhaps I should have emphasized more, spoke of the objection to tha evidence as based on its being obtained by "unethical" means (horrid phrase), although he adds &
by a misdemeanor under the laws of Washington.
I said that the State of Washington had made it a
crime and that the Government could not put
itself in the position of offering to pay for a crime
in order to get evidence of another crime. Brandeis
wrote much more elaborately, but I didn't agree
with all that he said. I should not have printed
what I wrote, however, if he had asked me to.
HoLMEs-PoLLocK LETTERS 222 (Howe ed. 1942)
(editor's footnotes omitted). Justice Brandeis' "much
more elaborate" dissent has been described by professor
Paul Freund, law secretary to the justice during the
1927-28 term:
It is obvious that the opinion grew in strength
and eloquence as it hammered out and as it evolved,
from a response to the unpleasantness in which
Samuel Warren found himself, through the ethical
principle of unclean hands to the ultimate philosophy of man's spiritual nature which Brandeis
found embodied in our Constitution. The crescendo
of feeling rises from stage to state-as Brandeis
is driven to explore ever more deeply the foundations of individual society.
Freund, Mr. Jiestice Brandeis, in MR. JUSTICE 97, 117
(Dunham & Kurland ed. 1956).
78The Supreme Court has warned time and again
76
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One need only compare the dissents of Holmes
and Brandeis in Olmstead and Burdeau v. McDowell," with the opinion in Byars v. UnitedStates,0
to realize that they were aware that a complicated
and subtle process of adjudication must necessarily
precede and underlie the doctrine's applicationm
Furthermore, one need go no further than Aldermat v. United States to demonstrate that the
imperative of judicial integrity does not inexorably
preclude the use of unlawfully obtained evidence.
In Alderman, the Court refused to expand the
rules relating to standing. The necessary effect
was to allow the government to utilize evidence
obtained in violation of the ConstitutionP If the
against uncritical reliance on and slavish adherence to
labels, formulas, and generalizations. See Harris v.
Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1969); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); United States v. Kahriger,
345 U.S. 22, 38 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187,
197 (1949); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Shapiro v. United States,
335 U.S. 1, 50 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948); Tiller v.
Atlantic Coast Lines, 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943); Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S.
510, 529 (1941); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penny Co., 311
U.S. 435, 449 (1940); Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338, 341 (1939); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 323 (1937); Henneford v. Silas Moran Co., 300
U.S. 577, 586 (1937); Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422,
429 (1935); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
114 (1934); Cooper v. Dasher, 290 U.S. 106,110 (1933);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922);
United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 448
(1920); Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Tonopah Tidewater Railroad Co., 248 U.S. 471, 475 (1919); Towne
v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918); Hyde v. United
States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Donell v. Herring Co., 208 U.S. 267, 273
(1907); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Otis v. Packer, 187 U.S.
606 (1903). See generally Holmes, supra note 21 at
451-55, 460-61.
79 256 U.S. 465, 477 (1921).

80 273 U.S. 28 (1927). In Byars, a unanimous Court,
on which sat both Holmes and Brandeis, upheld the
right of the federal government to use evidence improperly seized by state officials acting entirely on their
own account. Byars was later overruled in Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), which ironically
relied
on the Olmstead dissents.
81
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's approach to the problem
was equally flexible. Compare his opinion in McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) and Walder v.
United States, 347 U.S. 628 (1954) with his dissenting
opinion in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
233 (1960).
394 U.S. 165 (1969).
8 The law is replete with instances in which illegally secured evidence is properly admitted, notwithstanding the "imperative of judicial integrity."
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928);
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754-55 (1952);
Lewis v. Insurance Co. of North America, 416 F.2d
1077 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Teller, 412

imperative of judicial integrity does not warrant
exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence
offered in the case-in-chief to prove guilt, it can
have no application when the evidence is used
solely for impeachment on collateral matters.
USE OF UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE

FOP IrPEACHMENT PUPOSES DOES NOT
IMPEDE A DEPENDAwT's

IGiHT To TSam
An objection to extension of the Walder doctrine
to cases involving Mirandaviolations concerns the
possible inhibitory effect on a defendant's exercise
of his right to testify. It has been argued that the
"ability of the prosecution to use portions of the
statements illegally obtained from the defendant
for impeachment purposes may... force the
defendant to forego his right to testify in his own
behalf." 8 However, a concession that a defendant
may not take the witness stand because he is
apprehensive that his testimony may be impeached
by illegally obtained evidence does not settle the
matter. This concession marks not the end but the
beginning of a necessarily more discriminating
analysis than has been undertaken by those courts
which have subscribed to the infringement of the
right to testify argument.
The source of the right to testify is ultimately to
be found in the vague admonitory provisions of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.8 5 That right is
accorded a defendant in order that he may adequately present his version of a case to the jury.
But it is a hoary platitude that no witness has the
right to commit perjury. Thus, the right to testify
F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Scolnick,
392 F.2d 320 (3rd Cir. 1963); United States v. Martin,
372 F.2d 63, (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 919 (1967).
Compare Toohey v. United States, 404 F.2d 907 (9th
Cir. 1968) with Bynum v. United States, 262 F.2d
465, 468-68 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Cf. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 116 (2nd Cir. 1970) (exclusionary rule
of fourth amendment does not apply to parole revocation proceedings). Accord, Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F.
Supp. 648 (E.D.La. 1970), See also In re Martinez 1
Cal.- 3d 641, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734 (1970)
(exclusionary rules of Miranda and fourth amendment
do not apply to parole revocation proceedings).
84 Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172, 180
(9th Cir. 1968). See also People v. Marsh, 14 Mich.App.
518, 165 N.W.2d 853 (1968); State v. Brewton, 247
Ore. 241, 422 P.2d 581, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967).
For purposes of argument, it will be assumed that a
defendant has a constitutional right to take the stand
in his own behalf. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S.
570, 602 (1961) (Clark, J., concurring).
"'InNapue v. United States, 431 F. 2d 1230 (7th
Cir. 1970), the court recognized a sixth amendment
right to testify in one's own behalf.
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cannot be said to embrace a right to commit
perjury, for "[als a witness, a defendant is no more
to be... clothed with sanctity, simply because
he is under accusation" than he is "to be visited
with condemnation." 5 6 Consequently, to deny a
defendant the opportunity to engage in conduct
that is calculated to adversely affect the rights of
public justice and the integrity of the fact finding
process cannot be said to unconstitutionallyabridge his right to take the stand in his own behalf.57 In sum, Walder deprives a defendant of
nothing to which he is lawfully entitled; it merely
denies him a license to commit perjury with impunity.
It is universally accepted that when a defendant
takes the stand in his own behalf, he is subject to
cross-examination and can be impeached in the
same manner as any other witness. Furthermore,
testimony given by a plaintiff for his own benefit
in a civil suit is admissible against him in a subsequent criminal proceedingss It seems obvious
that a defendant who knows that his testimony
may be impeached will be more reluctant to take
the stand than if he were allowed to testify free
from a searching investigation by the prosecutor.
It is no less apparent that in a particular case, the
knowledge that his testimony may later be used
against him in a criminal proceeding may deter a
plaintiff from presenting his claim. While in both
-81Allison v. United States, 360 U.S. 203, 210 (1965).
When a defendant takes the stand in his own behalf,
he is subject to cross-examination, and he can be
impeached in the same manner as any other witness.
Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1957); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); Johnson v.
United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943); Raffel v. United
States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926); Powers v. United States,
223 U.S. 303 (1912); Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178
U.S. 304 (1900); Reagon v. United States, 157 U.S.
301 (1895).
8 From the emanations of various Supreme Court
opinions, there emerges with unmistakable clarity a
tacit recognition of the oft-forgotten truth that in
criminal prosecutions there are "rights of public justice" which must be protected. Cf. United States v.
Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966); Beavers v. Haubert,
198 U.S. 77. 87 (1905); Thompson v. United States,
155 U.S. 271, 274 (1894). See also Duplex P. P. Co. v.
Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488 (1920) (Brandeis, Holmes,
and Clark, J.J., dissenting): "Above all rights rises
duty to the community" for, "justice though due to
the accused is due to the accusser also." Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1933) see also Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); North Carolina v. Pierce,
395 U.S. 711, 721 n. 18 (1969); Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156, 197 (1952); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 243 (1894); Groppi v. Leslie, -F.2d(7th Cir.
1970); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969).
I Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 n.
23 (1968).
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instances a burden is imposed upon the right to
testify, in neither is it impermissible.
Indeed, if lawfully obtained prior inconsistent
statements can be used for impeachment without
imposing an unconstitutional burden on a defendant's right to testify, it is difficult to perceive
how the use of unlawfully obtained statements can
impermissibly burden that right. Since the intrinsic nature of the evidence is the same regardless
of the manner of acquisition, the burden, if there
be any, must stem from the illegality of that acquisition8 9 Accordingly, the question is whether
the illegality in the manner of acquisition imposes a
burden on a defendant different either in kind or
degree from that which would be imposed upon
him had the evidence been obtained legally. In
short, it must be determined whether a defendant
would be more reluctant to testify in his own behalf
when the evidence available for impeachment has
been unlawfully obtained than he would be had it
been lawfully acquired.
For illustrative purposes, assume that identical,
voluntary and reliable statements were obtained
from defendants X and Y. X's statement was
obtained illegally while Y's was obtained legally.
it may well be that defendant X will be somewhat
reticent about taking the stand and perjuring
himself. However, this hesitancy is different neither
in kind nor degree from that which defendant Y
experiences, for the evidence available for impeachment is identical in both cases. Indeed, it is
manifest that the intrinsic nature of the evidence
is unrelated to and unaffected by the manner in
which it was secured. It is equally apparent that
in determining whether to take the witness stand
and risk impeachment, neither X nor Y will be
concerned with how the evidence was obtained;
their concern will properly center on its contents.
Consequently, no greater burden is imposed on
X's right to testify by virtue of the fact that the
impeaching evidence was unlawfully acquired.
In sum, the legaility of the method of acquisition
of the evidence has no legal bearing on the narrow
question whether Walder will cause a defendant to
forego his right to testify. The decision whether to
exercise that right is unrelated, both legally and
factually, to the manner in which the police gathered the evidence. Rather, the decision to testify
depends upon a melange of imponderables which
81This presupposes, of course, that the illegality of
acquisition was not such as to render subject the
voluntariness and reliability of the statements.
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are loosely classified under the generic heading of
trial strategy.
Those who have championed the right to testify
argument have incorrectly assumed that the burden imposed on that right stemmed from the
manner in which the evidence was acquired. Reasoning from this faulty premise, they necessarily'
arrived at the incorrect conclusion that Walder
imposed an impermissible burden on a defendant's
right to testify in his own behalf.s °
Their assertion that WaIder might force a defendant to forego his right to testify has been
predicated upon Simmons v. United States."
It was there held that statements given by a
defendant at a suppression hearing could not be
used by the government at trial in its case-inchief. The Court was sensitive to the Hobson's
choice faced by a defendant who wishes to assert
his fourth amendment right but realizes that the
price for such assertion may be the relinquishment
of his fifth amendment rights:
It seems obvious that a defendant who knows that
his testimony may be admissible against him at
trial will sometimes be deterred from presenting
the testimonial proof of standing necessary to
assert a Fourth Amendment claim.... [W]e find
it intollerable that one constitutional right should
have to be surrendered in order to assert another.)
Relying on Simmons, it has been argued that
sanctioning the use of unconstitutionally obtained
evidence for impeachment forces a defendant to
choose between exercising his constitutional right
to suppress such evidence and his constitutional
90In People v. Marsh, 14 Mich.App. 518, 165 N.W.2d 853 (1968), the court approved the right to testify
argument. However, it acknowledged that a defendant
who commits perjury could later be tried for that
offense and, that, at the subsequent trial, improperly
obtained statements would be admissible. There are
four serious difficulties with this approach. First, it
would needlessly crowd court calendars thereby exacerbating an already desperate problem. Second, if
threat of impeachment would force a defendant to
relinquish his right to testify, then the threat of future
prosecution for perjury would have an even more
devastating effect. Third, in cases where severe penalties
may be imposed, a defendant could choose to take the
stand and lie, since the speculative risks of a subsequent
perjury trial are far outweighed by the more immediate
threat posed by conviction for a serious offense. Cf.
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). Finally, experience has taught that juries are generally unwilling to
convict a defendant of perjury. Consequently, prosecutors are loathe to bring such prosecutions since the
chances of success are minimal.
91390 U.S. 337 (1968).

'Id. at 394.

right to take the stand.9 3 So stated, the argument
is insiduously persuasive. However, its similarity
to Simmons is semantic only, and its appeal, as
well as its flaw, lies in the delusive exactness of its
premises.
The difficulty with this thesis is that it begins not
with an inquiry but with an answer, thereby avoiding the very question to be decided. It starts with
the broad assumption that a defendant has the
right to have unconstitutionally obtained evidence
suppressed. Doubts as to the applicability of that
proposition to the factual situation envisioned by
Walder and its progeny are lulled by studied avoidance of reference to that concrete setting. However,
"rights must be judged in their context and not
in vacuo." 94
Thus, the threshold question is whether a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf
and commits perjury has the right to suppress
unconstitutionally obtained evidence offered for
impeachment. In the initial resolution of this
question, the rationale of Simmons has no bearing.
Indeed, it cannot be determined whether Walder
violates Simmons by requiring a defendant, desiring to suppress unconstitutionally obtained
evidence, to forfeit his right to testify until it has
first been established that he has that right in a
Wal er-type setting.
If Simmons does not preclude the use of evidence
offered at a suppression hearing to impeach a
defendant who later takes the stand at trial and
commits perjury, then it cannot bar the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence to impeach a
perjurous defendant. For, if impeachment does not
create an unconstitutional burden in the former
1 See, e.g., Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172
(9th Cir. 1968); People v. Marsh, 14 Mich.App. 518,
165 N.W.2d 853 (1968); State v. Brewton, 247 Ore.
241, 422 P.2d 581, cerl. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967).
9Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 303 (1941)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Cf. Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
Whether Waderwill have an impact on a defendant's
decision to take the stand cannot be considered in the
abstract. See United States v. Hart, 407 F.2d 1087
(2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 916 (1969). The possibilhty of undue prejudice resulting from collateral
impeachment is an important consideration in determining whether Walder should be followed in a given
case. However, as in cases of impeachment by prior
convictions, it is a relevant consideration only after
the need for the defendant's testimony free from
collateral impeachment has been demonstrated. Compare United States v. Cox, 428 F.2d 638, 689 n.4 (7th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Costa, 425 F.2d 950 (2nd
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970); United
States v. Cacchillo, 416 F.2d 231 (2nd Cir. 1969);
Evans v. United States, 397 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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instance, by simple parity of reasoning it cannot
do so in the latter.
A careful reading of Simmons lends the distinct
impression that it permits the prosecution to
impeach a defendant with evidence given at a
suppression hearing. The Court took pains to
point out that its holding precluded only the use of
suppression hearing evidence on the issue of guilt.95
The Judicial Conference Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure has incorporated this holding in its preliminary draft of
The Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States
District Courts and Magistrates.96 Under Proposed

Rule 1-04(d), "[t]estimony given by [a defendant]
is not admissible against him on the issue of guilt
at the trial." 97 The Committee's advisory notes
sustain the contention that Simmons does not
preclude impeachment by resort to evidence given
at the suppression hearing:
The inadmissibility of the testimony of the accused
is based on Simmons v. United States.... It re-

moves obstacles in the way of enforcing constitutional right.... Inadmissibilityis, however, limited
to the issue of guilt. Use of the testimonyfor purposes

11Note the meticulous language employed by the
Court in restricting its holding:
Finally, it is contended that it was reversible
error to allow the Government to use against
Garret on the issue of guilt the testimony given by

him upon his.., motion to suppress....

[I-le contends that testimony given by a defendant to meet such requirements should not
be admissible against him on the question of guilt
and innocence. We agree.

We therefore hold that when a defendant testifies
in support of a motion to suppress evidence on
Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may
not be admitted against him at trial on the issue of
guilt unless he makes no objection.
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-394
(1968) (emphasis added).
96 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969).
97 Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
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of impeachment is not precluded in the event the
accused testifies at the trial inconsistently with his
testimony at the hearing. See Walder v. United
States.... The limitation on cross-examination is
similarly based.8
When viewed in proper perspective, the right to
testify argument is not impressive. In future
examinations of the question, courts might do well
to keep before them as a living faith Mr. Justice
Holmes' subtle admonition: "The word 'right' is
one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is easy to
slip from a qualified meaning in the premise to an
unqualified one in the conclusion. Most rights are
qualified." 99
CONCLUSION
The application of Walder to Miranda situations
neither runs afoul of the deterrence rationale nor
the "imperative of judicial integrity." The desiderata underlying the exclusionary rules are not violated by allowing impeachment of a perjurous
defendant. However, by interpreting those rules to
demand that unconstitutionally seized, though
reliable, evidence be inadmissible for impeachment,
perjury would be condoned thereby seriously
jeopardizing the integrity of the federal judiciary
and the fact-finding process itself.
Criminal defendants ought not to be allowed to
take the stand and commit perjury with impunity
while courts stand helplessly by, fettered by a rule
of their own making, a rule which is neither demanded by the Constitution nor by any sound
principle of justice. Walder achieved a workable
accommodation between the rule of total exclusion
and that which would authorize unlimited admittance of evidence; it must not be abandoned.
98Id. at 191 (emphasis added). The distinction is
no mere quiddity. See Sharp v. United States, 410
F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1969). Cf. Gordon v. United States,
383 F.2d 936, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
99American Bank and Trust Co. v. Federal Bank,
256 U.S. 350, 358 (1921).

Editor's Note
As this issue went to press, the Supreme Court decided Harrisv. New York,.U.S.. (2/24/71). In Harris,Chief
justice Burger, writing for a 5-4 majority, found that "trustworthy" statements procured in violation of Miranda
are admissible for impeachment purposes even if more than collaterally related to the crime charged. It is felt

that this article answers many of the questions left unresolved by Harrisand will be a useful guide to the implementation of that decision.

